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Many large urban school districts are rethinking their personnel management strategies, often giving
increased control to schools in the hiring of teachers, reducing, for example, the importance of seniority.
If school hiring authorities are able to make good decisions about whom to hire, these reforms have
the potential to benefit schools and students.  Prior research on teacher transfers uses career history
data, identifying the school in which a teacher teaches in each year.  When this data is used to see
which teachers transfer, it is unclear the extent to which the patterns are driven by teacher preferences
or school preferences, since the matching of teachers to schools is a two-sided choice. This study uses
applications-to-transfer data to examine separately which teachers apply for transfer and which get
hired and, in so doing, differentiates teacher from school preferences. Holding all else equal, we find
that teachers with better pre-service qualifications (certification exam scores; college competitiveness)
are more likely to apply for transfer, while teachers whose students demonstrate higher achievement
growth are less likely. On the other hand, schools prefer to hire “higher quality” teachers across measures
that signal quality. The results suggest not only that more effective teachers prefer to stay in their school,
but that when given the opportunity schools are able to identify and hire the best candidates.
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Current education policy discussions often focus on the importance of teachers and the need 
to improve teacher quality.  In order to achieve and maintain a strong workforce, schools need to 
attract high-quality teachers, select the best teachers from the pool of candidates available, and retain 
those teachers who are particularly effective.  The current research literature describes the career 
paths of teachers and how those vary by teacher quality (see Boyd et. al., 2005; Hanushek, Kain, 
O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005; and Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2007 for examples).  However, this 
research does not distinguish between the preferences of teachers and those of employers.  Do 
higher quality teachers seek to leave schools?  Do schools select high-quality candidates from the 
pool of teachers interested in their positions?  How do these relationships differ across different 
dimensions of quality and across teachers in different types of schools?  This paper sheds light on 
these questions by examining teachers' applications to transfer, which allow the separation of 
teachers' decisions to apply from schools’ decisions to hire.  Understanding the role of teachers in 
comparison to the role of school hiring authorities in determining the sorting of teachers across 
schools allows policy makers both to more effectively target the causes of the disparities in the 
teacher workforce across schools and to better predict the effects of new policies such as those that 
give schools greater flexibility in hiring.  
Teacher quality is an imprecise concept.  At times, research and policy discussions use 
proxies for teacher quality based on teachers' pre-service qualifications such as certification status, 
teachers' own test performance, or the characteristics of their college or graduate education.  At 
other times, researchers and policy-makers proxy teacher quality by using practice-based measures 
such as teaching experience or the test performance gains of students, often referred to as teachers' 
value-added to student achievement. Studies show that teachers with higher pre-service 
qualifications are typically more likely to transfer across schools and leave teaching altogether (Boyd 
et. al., 2005; Goldhaber et al., 2007).  Boyd et. al. (2005) find that this relationship is especially strong 
in low-achieving schools.  On the other hand, research on practice-based measures, such as teacher 
experience and value-added to student achievement scores, demonstrate the opposite result. 
Experienced teachers are less likely to leave schools than are their less experienced peers (Ingersoll 
& Smith, 2003; Marvel, Lyter, Peltola, Strizek, & Morton, 2007); and, more effective teachers are less 
likely to transfer and leave the profession than are less effective teachers (Boyd et. al., 2007; 
Hanushek et al., 2005; Goldhaber et al., 2007).  For example, Goldhaber et. al. (2007) find that the 2 
 
most effective teachers remain in teaching and in the same school for the longest period of time.
1 
Moreover, this holds true for effective teachers at both low and high achieving schools. 
Prior studies of teacher turnover have depended upon career history data to estimate 
teachers’ preferences for specific schools and features of schools. The drawback of this approach is 
that career moves, particularly transfers across schools, are not driven solely by teachers’ choices. 
The choices of school hiring authorities as well as the requirements of institutional structures and 
policies, such as seniority transfer rights, can mask the relationship between teachers’ preferences 
and job changes.
2  Work history data can tell us when movement occurs but does not capture the 
joint nature of hiring decisions - where both a teacher’s decision to apply for transfer and a school’s 
decision to hire that teacher determine the final matching. We do not know, for example, whether 
teachers with higher pre-service qualifications are more likely to transfer because they are in higher 
demand or because they are more likely to seek transfer in the first place.  Likewise, we are unsure 
whether more effective teachers, as measured by student test score gains, tend to stay because they 
prefer their current settings or because their effectiveness is not currently rewarded in school hiring 
practices. 
This study begins to untangle supply from demand characteristics in teacher transfer by 
focusing on applications-to-transfer data files which provide a unique view into the teacher labor 
market. Examining which teachers apply for transfer sheds light on teacher preferences. At the same 
time, we can look at which applicants are selected for hire and which are not in order to estimate 
school preferences for teachers.  Two substantive questions guide our study: Which teachers are 
more likely to request transfers? What kinds of teachers do schools choose to hire? Additionally, we 
ask the methodological question: What do we learn from applications data that we would not have 
learned from work history files alone? 
 
Change in NYC Transfer Request System   
This study draws on data from an open-market system for NYC teachers to apply for 
transfer.  In 2005, the Department of Education and its teachers union decided to reform prior 
hiring policies to move away from a system that was based on seniority and gave teachers and 
                                                            
1 The authors measure teacher effectiveness as the teacher’s value-added contribution towards student achievement on 
standardized tests.  
2 In related research, Boyd et. al. (2009) employ a matching model to estimate the preferences of school hiring 
authorities and prospective teachers for the initial match of teachers to schools.  They find that employers generally 
value teacher quality as measured by credentials and that teachers value salary and school working conditions, including 
distance from their home.  3 
 
principals little input in hiring decisions to a more free-market approach. Previously, teachers applied 
for and received transfers through the central Human Resources or district offices, “a behind the 
scenes process that many teachers and schools found inscrutable” (Daly et al., 2008, p. 14).  Human 
Resources staff assigned new placements to “excessed” teachers - who had been displaced from 
their jobs for any number of reasons, such as school closure or changing enrollment - often without 
teacher or principal input.  The new policy requires that all teachers seeking transfer – both 
voluntary and involuntary - enter an open, applications system where hiring decisions are made 
mutually by teacher and principal. Senior teachers can no longer claim the positions of novice 
teachers due to seniority, a practice that that previously tied the hands of principals in the hiring 
process. To achieve these objectives, the district instituted a more centralized hiring system, 
including an online infrastructure for searching job postings and applying to them directly. The open 
market system allows for transfers during a window that begins the last week in April and closes the 
first week in August.  Transfers that occur outside of this period are not subject to the open market 
process and all hiring occurs from the teachers who had been excessed and had not found jobs.   
 
Expanding the Signals of Teacher Quality  
The two dimensions of teacher quality measurement discussed so far – pre-service 
qualifications and practice-based measures – are incomplete characterizations of quality. While we 
cannot hope to capture the full complexity of teacher quality, we do explore two additional 
characteristics of teachers that schools may consider in their estimations of teacher quality during 
hiring decisions – preparation pathway and race or ethnicity.  A teacher’s pathway into teaching may 
proxy for better preparation or better recruitment and selection. And, given the over-representation 
of white teachers relative to student demographics, schools may view recruiting a more racially 
diverse teaching force as a means for improving the overall ability of its staff and program to serve 
students.  Some evidence also supports the possibility that black teachers can be particularly 
effective for black students (Dee, 2004). 
Teacher turnover does vary by teacher preparation pathway. Overall, teachers with regular or 
standard certification types are the less likely to move schools or leave teaching than teachers with 
provisional certification, and teachers from alternative routes are more likely to leave teaching and to 
transfer across schools than teachers from traditional routes (Marvel et al., 2001; Fisk, Prowda, & 
Beaudin, 2001; Fowler, 2003). Most relevant to our work, Boyd et. al. (2006) describe these 
programs in more detail and find significant variation by pathway in NYC teacher attrition. 4 
 
Compared to college-recommending or traditional route teachers, Boyd et. al. report that 
substantially fewer Teaching Fellows and Teach for America (TFA) teachers – the two largest 
alternative pathways serving NYC – left teaching after the first year. By the end of the fourth year, 
college-recommending teachers were much less likely to have left the profession (44.6 percent) than 
teachers from the Teaching Fellows program (54.7 percent), who in turn experienced much lower 
attrition than TFA teachers (81.3 percent).  The higher likelihood among TFA teachers to remain in 
teaching after the first year and to leave after the second year likely reflects the programmatic 
expectation to commit to two years of teaching. 
Teacher turnover also varies by teacher race and ethnicity. Using national averages, Marvel et 
al. (2001) report that white teachers (83.9 percent) are more likely to stay in the same school than 
black (79.3 percent) or Hispanic (80.6 percent) teachers. About ten percent of Hispanic and black 
teachers migrate schools as compared to about eight percent of white teachers. Black teachers are 
the most likely to leave the profession altogether.  However, national average statistics may mask 
important differences in variation by teacher race or ethnicity because they do not account for 
differential sorting into and out of certain kinds of schools or districts, nor do they account for other 
teacher characteristics that may be associated with race or ethnicity. For example, migration and 
attrition rates that appear to vary by teacher race or ethnicity may simply reflect that teachers of 
different race and ethnicity tend to teach at different types of schools. Among studies that control 
for school, district, and other teacher characteristics, white teachers generally are less likely to stay in 
a school from year to year than are non-white teachers (Ingersoll, 2001; Kirby, Berends, & Naftel , 
1999; Murnane et al., 1991). Boyd et. al. (2005) and Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin (2004) also find 
significant interactions between teacher race and racial composition of student body in predicting 
the probability of transferring within NYC schools. Namely, white and Hispanic teachers are more 
likely to leave schools with increasing proportions of black students and decreasing proportions of 
white students, while there is no significant relationship between retention and student racial 
composition for black teachers.  
 
DATA  
NYC Administrative Data   
The primary data for this paper come from the New York City Department of Education 
Transfer Request System.  The data include the applications for open positions for the 2006-07 and 
2007-08 academic years.  Each application identifies the teacher as well as characteristics of the open 5 
 
positions such as the school and the subject area. This data also indicates which applicants were 
hired for a given position.
3   
To this data, we have linked an array of additional data on teachers and schools in the New 
York City School District. Data on teacher characteristics include demographic information (race, 
gender, age); information on professional preparation pathway; and measures for teacher quality – 
including years of experience and pre-service qualifications (LAST teacher certification exam score 
and whether teachers attended a competitive undergraduate college). Additionally, we have used 
student achievement data for a subset of teachers in our study to estimate their effectiveness by 
calculating teachers’ value-added to student achievement scores (described in more detail below). 
Data on schools include school level (elementary, middle, high school, or other grade combination), 
student race and ethnicity, student eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch, student English learner 
status, when the schools was established, the experience of teachers in the school, school 
enrollment, crime rates, and a host of other variables.
4  
Teachers:  Table 1 presents summary statistics on characteristics of the 80,898 active 
teachers in our sample.
5 About 13 percent of teachers became appliers at least once over two years; 
of those who became appliers, 42 percent successfully transferred through the Transfer Request 
System at least one time over two years.
6 Of all active teachers in NYC, three quarters were female 
and 62 percent were white. On average, teachers were about 41 years old with seven and a half years 
of experience. Most had initially entered teaching through college-recommending (traditional) routes 
(43 percent). 
  Table 1 demonstrates also that teachers who applied for transfer differed somewhat from 
the overall population of active teachers. Appliers were less likely to be female and white, were less 
experienced, a bit younger, and less likely to come from a college-recommending teacher preparation 
                                                            
3 We know if a teacher was hired, but do not know who else may have received a job offer for the same position. In 
terms of estimating school preferences for teachers, we would prefer to know all teachers who received job offers.  
4 Boyd et. al. (2005) provides more detail on the sources of this data.    
5 By “active” we mean teachers that are in the human resources data-base as paid regular teachers at the beginning of the 
school year who are working at 70 percent of full-time or more. Teachers who had taken leave, quit, or were of 
unknown status were dropped from our sample. Though teachers who quit or were on leave, for instance, make up 
some of the teachers who entered the Transfer Request System, there were relatively few. It did not make sense to 
include these teachers because we were interested in accounting for the effects of teachers’ current school workplace on 
their applying and transferring behaviors, often with school fixed effects. Given these teachers were not currently in 
schools, such models could not apply.  Our sample includes teachers who taught in NYC classrooms during either or 
both of the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 academic years. In 2006-2007 there were 72,323 teachers in our sample. Most of 
these teachers were still active in NYC classrooms in 2007-2008, though some left teaching or left the state. Still other 
teachers entered teaching or the district in the second year of our study, resulting in 73,370 active teachers in our 2007-
2008 sample. Altogether, 80,898 teachers were active in NYC classrooms in either or both academic years we studied.   
6 9.7 percent of active teachers became appliers in 2006-2007 and 8.0 percent became appliers in 2007-2008. 6 
 
pathway.  Those who entered teaching through the Teaching Fellows program, in particular, made 
up a relatively high proportion of appliers. Compared to all who applied for transfer, those who 
were successful (movers) were less likely to be white and were younger. They were also slightly less 
experienced, but had higher LAST certification exam scores and were more likely to come from 
colleges ranked as competitive by Barrons. Compared to teachers who initially entered the 
profession with a temporary license, Teaching Fellows made up a lower concentration of active 
teachers and appliers in NYC, but a higher concentration of movers.
 7 
By examining whether active teachers are in a different placement in 2007-2008 than they are 
in 2006-2007 according to work history files, we can estimate the total number of movers and 
compare this number to the Transfer Request System data.
8 As described earlier, the Transfer 
Request System is in place only from April until August. Since schools need to fill vacancies 
throughout the year, transfer hires that occur outside of the system draw from the pool of excessed 
teachers who had not previously found work. Approximately half of all migration of NYC teachers 
occurred within the Transfer Request System. Given that they had previously been excessed and 
were unable to find jobs while the open-market Transfer Request System was active, one might 
expect those who migrated outside the Transfer Request System to differ from those who migrated 
within it. To assess this, we used multivariate, logistic regression to model whether migrating 
teachers used the Transfer Request System as a function of teacher characteristics.
9  Those who 
migrated through the Transfer Request System were more likely to be younger, less experienced, 
Hispanic, from a selective college, have higher certification exam scores, and have entered teaching 
through the Teaching Fellows program. Most schools received transfers from both inside and 
outside of the Transfer Request System.  
  Teacher Quality:  Our analyses include three dimensions and six measures of teacher quality: 
1.  Pre-service Quality Measures (Qualifications) 
a.  Whether a teacher attended a competitive college 
b.  Teacher Certification (LAST) exam score  
2.  Practice-Based Quality Measures 
a.  Teacher experience (in years)  
                                                            
7 Beginning in the fall of 2003, new temporary license (uncertified) teachers were permitted only in extraordinary 
circumstances.  However, a large number of teachers who had previously entered the system as uncertified remain, 
having since acquired certification.  
8 We use the beginning-of-year placement in both academic years to estimate current school placement for a given year.   
9 The specifics of these models and results are available upon request from the authors.   7 
 
b.  Teacher effectiveness: value-added to student achievement scores 
3.  Additional Signals 
a.  Teacher race and ethnicity  
b.  Pathway into teaching 
About 33 percent of teachers in our sample graduated from colleges rated in the top two out 
of four tiers of competitiveness according to Barron’s ratings. As part of their NYC certification 
requirements, teachers had to take the Liberal Arts and Sciences Test (LAST) intended to measure 
“knowledge and skills in the liberal arts and sciences, in teaching theory and practice, and in the 
content area of the candidate’s field of certification” (NYSTCE, 2009). The exam includes a 
multiple-choice section covering scientific, mathematical, and technological processes; historical and 
social scientific awareness; artistic expression and humanities; communication and research skills; 
and written analysis and expression.  There is also a written component requiring teachers to prepare 
a response to an assigned topic.  Teachers had an average score on the LAST exam of 248 (s.d. = 
30).   
Regarding practice-based measures, teachers average approximately seven and a half years of 
teaching experience. Over a third of teachers (36 percent) have three or fewer years of experience; 
slightly under a third (32 percent) have more than ten years of experience. In terms of teachers’ 
value-added to student achievement, we modeled student achievement in math
10 as a function of 
student fixed-effects, student time-varying characteristics, classroom characteristics, school 
characteristics, grade and year fixed effects, and teacher fixed-effects.
 11 Because math is tested only 
in grades three through eight and not all teachers teach math, we only have value-added scores for a 
subset of teachers (n=13,223). Teachers in this study have a mean value-added score of -0.33 
(s.d.=0.24) with a minimum score of -2.5 and a maximum of +1.1.
12    The time-varying student 
characteristics in the models include prior math and English language arts scores (both linear and 
squared), whether they changed schools that year, whether their home language is English, whether 
                                                            
10 Our main analyses focus on value-added to student achievement in math. However, we also ran models with a 
measure for teacher effectiveness that uses value-added to student achievement in English Language Arts (ELA).  Our 
results are similar, so we report primarily on the math value-added measure.  In our results sections we note how results 
using ELA value-added measure are similar and different. Student achievement was normalized to have a zero mean and 
unit standard deviation.   
11 Prior to 2006, New York State administered examinations in mathematics and English language arts for grades four 
and eight. In addition, the New York City Department of Education tested 3rd, 5th, 6th and 7th graders in these subjects. 
All the exams are aligned to the New York State learning standards and IRT methods were used to convert raw scores 
(e.g., number or percent of questions correctly answered) into scale scores. New York State began administering all the 
tests in 2006.  For more detail on the tests, see CTB/McGraw-Hill (2006).   
12 See Appendix Figure A for the distribution of LAST score, years of experience, and teacher value-added scores. 8 
 
they are eligible for free lunch, whether they are eligible for reduced-price lunch, whether they are 
English language learners, their prior-year absences, and their prior year suspensions.  The 
classroom-level controls include the percent of Hispanic students, black students, Asian students, 
other non-white students, English language learners, students whose home language is English, free 
lunch eligible students, and reduced-priced lunch eligible students.   They also include class size, the 
standard deviation of lagged math score and lagged English language arts scores, and the average lag 
absences, lag suspensions, lagged math score, and lagged English language arts scores.  The school-
level controls include enrollment, the percent of black students, the percent of Hispanic students, 
the percent of free lunch students, the percent of English language learners, and the expenditures 
per pupil.   
Sixty two percent of active teachers in our sample are non-Hispanic whites, with another 19 
percent black and 13 percent Hispanic.  Approximately 43 percent of teachers in the district entered 
teaching through traditional college-recommending pathways, while others entered through 
alternative early-entry routes such as the New York City Teaching Fellows (12 percent) and Teach 
for America (two percent).  Many teachers entered without initial certification, through temporary 
licensure (22 percent). 
  Schools:  The teachers in our sample teach at 1366 different schools, over one-half of which 
are elementary schools, about one-fourth high schools, one-fifth middle schools, and less than one 
percent falling outside of these designations (“other”).
13  Table 2 describes the schools. On average, 
over three-fourths of students are Hispanic or black in NYC schools, with a slightly higher 
concentration of Hispanic than black students overall.  About 70 percent of students qualify for 
school lunch and almost 15 percent of students scored in the lowest-level on their math 
achievement exam.    
  Teachers sort by quality measures into schools serving different student demographics. 
Table 3 shows that black teachers teach in schools with the highest concentration of black students 
while Hispanic teachers teach in schools with the highest concentration of Hispanic students. 
Relative to teachers from other racial or ethnic backgrounds, white teachers teach in schools with 
the fewest poor and lowest-achieving students. Compared to teachers from early-entry pathways, 
college-recommending teachers teach in schools with the lowest concentrations of black, Hispanic, 
                                                            
13 Because we have value-added data only on teachers in grades 4-8, we run many models without value-added as a 
predictor to utilize our full sample. Thus, we present summary statistics on schools in our full sample, which include all 
grade levels, and not just grades 4-8.  9 
 
poor, and lowest-achieving students; TFA teachers, in particular, work in schools with the highest 
proportion of students across these demographic groups.  
  By most measures that signal teacher quality, Table 3 demonstrates that high quality teachers 
generally teach in schools with fewer black, Hispanic, poor and low-performing students. This trend 
holds for LAST score, undergraduate competitiveness, and experience.  Exceptions are that teachers 
from the most competitive colleges teach at schools with higher proportions of Hispanic students 
than do teachers from the least competitive colleges. Similarly, teachers from the top quartile in 
LAST scores teach in schools with more Hispanic students than do teachers from the bottom 
quartile. One possible explanation for these exceptions is that the Teaching Fellows and TFA 
programs tend to recruit teachers with strong pre-service qualifications and place their teachers in 




Question 1: Which teachers are more likely to request a transfer?  
To model teachers’ choices to apply for a transfer we use logit models at the teacher-level 
and include all active teachers in NYC. We model the likelihood of applying for transfer as a 
function of teacher characteristics and fixed-effects for teachers’ current schools. The fixed effects 
controlled for both measured and unmeasured characteristics of schools that might affect a teacher’s 
likelihood of applying for transfer. For example, if teachers with one characteristic tended to be in 
less desirable schools we might think that teachers with that characteristic are more likely to request 
transfers, unless we account for school-specific differences in applications.  With these controls we 
estimate the extent to which a teacher with a given characteristic is more or less likely to apply 






In the above equation, the probability that teacher t, in school s, and in year y requests a transfer is a 
function of teacher characteristics  tsy X  (gender, race, preparation pathway, quality), a school year 



















Question 2: What kinds of teachers do schools want?   
To model school choices for hiring teachers, we use application-level models where the 
likelihood of a school selecting (hiring) an applicant - from the set of applicants to a school – is as a 





In Equation 2, the probability that teacher t is hired by school sto in year y, conditional on applying to 
school sto, is a function of teacher characteristics  y asto X (gender, race, preparation pathway, quality), a 
school year indicator  y  , school fixed effects 
to s  , and a random error term  y asto  . 
 
 Question 3:  What do we learn from applications data that we would not have learned from 
work-history files alone?   
Finally, we want to assess the additional information gained by using transfer data instead of 
the work history files that have been used in prior studies.  In order to make this comparison, we 
estimate the likelihood of transferring based on the work-history files of all active teachers in NYC. 
Using fixed-effects on current schools, we model the likelihood of transferring as a function of 





In the above equation, the probability that teacher t, in school s, and in year y transfers is a function 
of teacher characteristics  tsy X  (gender, race, preparation pathway, quality), a school year indicator 
variable  y  , school fixed effects  s  , and a random error term  tsy  . 
 
RESULTS 
Before addressing our three research questions, we look briefly at the kinds of schools from 
which and to which teachers tend to apply.  Table 4 gives the results of our estimates modeling the 




































log of the number of applicants that schools receive per vacancy and of the estimates modeling the 
log of the number of requests for transfer away from schools per enrollment as a function of school 
characteristics.
14  Because school-level data on the proportion of lowest-achieving students was 
available only for grades four and eight, including this predictor in our analyses removes most high 
schools and greatly diminishes our sample. Thus, we run analyses both without (Model 1) and with 
(Model 2) the proportion of lowest-achieving students.
15   
The kinds of schools that receive the fewest applicants are in many ways similar to the kinds 
of schools that teachers want to leave. In keeping with previous studies, these schools have higher 
concentrations of students that are typically underserved - Hispanic, black, low-income, and low-
achieving students.   Compared to elementary schools, middle schools receive significantly fewer 
applicants to them and more requests for transfer away from them. Controlling for other school 
features, middle schools receive about 40 percent fewer applicants to them and about 40 percent 
more away from them.  Additionally, schools with lower attendance rates, fewer experienced faculty, 
and higher suspension rates receive more requests for transfer away from them. On the other hand, 
low-crime schools receive more applicants per vacancy to them.  School enrollment is the only 
predictor in our models whose effect is both significant and in the same direction across dependent 
variables. Low-enrollment schools get more applicants to them and away from them.  One possible 
explanation, though we cannot test it, is that small schools are appealing to teachers because of their 
intimacy, resulting in more applications. However, once there, teachers find that while some low-
enrollment schools do have great benefits, others lack resources or sources of support that larger 
schools are able to provide given economies of scale.  
Given how requests for transfer vary significantly by school type, subsequent analyses rely 
upon models with school fixed-effects. Such school fixed-effects models compare teachers only to 
                                                            
14 We use logs because of the positive skew of these distributions. The coefficients can then be interpreted as 
approximate percent change. Appendix Figure B provides the distributions of the original variables and the transformed 
variables. School characteristics were based on school averages using administrative data over the years 2003-2006; crime 
and suspension data are based on school averages over 2000-2006 because of missing data on these measures. We also 
ran the “applicants away” analyses again, but after dropping schools that closed anytime during the two years that we 
have applications data. We were concerned because school closures would result in an unusually high percentage of 
teachers from a closing school into the Transfer Request System. Given that certain kinds of schools may be more likely 
to close – e.g. underserved, under-performing, etc. – we worried this would bias our estimates. However, our results 
remained consistent even after dropping schools that closed during our time frame. While we do not present the results 
here, they are available upon request from the authors.  
15 Results between Models 1 and 2 differ, in part, because they are looking at different samples of schools. Also, the 
proportion of lowest-achieving students is related to other predictors in our model. For example, schools with higher 
proportions of black students also typically have higher proportions of lowest-achieving students. Thus, including the 
proportion of lowest-achieving students in models may change the point estimates on the proportion of black students.   12 
 
their colleagues currently teaching in the same school so separate teacher effects from school effects 
on application behaviors. This allows us to estimate how teacher characteristics predict the 
likelihood of requesting a transfer in ways that account for the fact that certain kinds of teachers sort 
into certain kinds of schools.  
 
Question 1: Which teachers are more likely to request transfers?   
As discussed in the introduction, transfer behavior may not be a good measure of teacher 
preferences because - while teachers prefer to transfer if they apply - they must be selected by a 
school in order to actually transfer. Here we test whether requests for transfer vary by these teacher 
quality measures and thus target teachers’ choices by separating teachers’ choices to enter the 
applications-for-transfer pool from schools’ choices to hire certain applicants. Table 5 presents the 
estimates in odds ratios for the likelihood of requesting a transfer as a function of teacher 
characteristics, including our four primary teacher quality measures, race and ethnicity, preparation 
route, as well as current school fixed-effects.
16 
  Of all teachers in NYC, teachers with higher pre-service qualifications are more likely to 
request transfers. Controlling for other teacher characteristics and fixing the effects of their current 
schools, teachers with higher LAST scores and those from the most competitive colleges are 
significantly more likely to request transfers. Teachers with one standard deviation higher LAST 
scores are more likely to apply for transfer by a factor of 1.06 to 1.08, depending on model 
specification. Having graduated from a competitive college increases a teacher’s likelihood of 
requesting a transfer by 10 to 20 percent. These results provide evidence that the increased 
likelihood to transfer among teachers with better pre-service qualifications is driven, at least in part, 
by such teachers being more likely to enter the job market in the first place.  
  Are teachers with higher practice-based measures of quality also more likely to request 
transfers?  Again the results are consistent with prior literature based on work histories – more 
experienced and more effective (higher value-added to student achievement) teachers are 
significantly less likely to apply for transfer.  In fact, the likelihood of a first year teacher requesting 
transfer is 1.5 times greater than it is for other teachers.  Increasing a teachers’ value-added score by 
                                                            
16 Because we do not have college competitiveness data on our full sample, we run Model 1 without college 
competitiveness as an indicator. As discussed previously, we have value-added data only on teachers in grades 4-8. Since 
we wanted to show results for our full sample in our other models, we include value-added as a quality indicator only in 
Model 6.  We re-ran all models on the reduced sample of teachers for whom we have both value-added and college 
competitiveness data and got similar results. These models are available upon request from the authors.   13 
 
one standard deviation reduces the odds of requesting a transfer by ten percent.
17  Somewhat 
unexpectedly, we found that this value-added effect was strongest among middle school teachers.  
Appendix Table 1, which shows the results at each school level, demonstrates that an increase of 
one standard deviation on value-added reduces the odds of requesting a transfer among middle 
school teachers by almost twenty percent.   
Table 5 also shows a significant relationship between the likelihood of requesting a transfer 
and a teacher's preparation pathway. In general, teachers from early-entry (alternative) routes are 
more likely to request transfers than are teachers from college-recommended (traditional) pathways. 
Across preparation routes and models, the odds that an early-entry teacher will enter the applications 
pool are a factor of between 1.1 and 1.5 times higher than for a college-recommending teacher. The 
exception is TFA teachers who are significantly less likely to request transfers than college-
recommending teachers. This is unsurprising given that TFA teachers have a programmatic 
commitment to serve in certain kinds of schools for two years, so are unlikely to enter the 
applications pool during this time.  
  Teacher race and ethnicity also predicts requests for transfer. Black and Hispanic teachers 
are significantly less likely to apply for transfer than are white teachers working in the same schools. 
Being black or Hispanic decreases the odds of applying for transfer about as much as a four 
standard deviation increase in effectiveness. When we ran these models without school fixed effects, 
black and Hispanic teachers were significantly more likely to apply for transfer.
18  Taken together, 
these results suggest that black and Hispanic teachers tend to teach in schools from which teachers 
are more likely to request transfers in general.  
  While our modeling strategy is effective for estimating preferences for certain kinds of 
teachers across all schools, perhaps a more policy-relevant concern is whether these preferences may 
vary across different kinds of teachers and schools. For example, teachers may base their preferences 
upon the “fit” or “match” they may have with the schools.  To begin to examine this fit hypothesis, 
we include interactions between teachers' and students' on race and academic achievement.  
Appendix Table 4 presents estimates for the effects of these interactions on likelihood of applying.  
It shows that black teachers are less likely to apply for transfer from schools with higher 
concentrations of black students; likewise, Hispanic teachers are less likely to apply for transfer from 
                                                            
17 When using teachers’ value-added to student achievement in ELA instead of math, we find that teachers with higher 
value-added scores are still less likely to apply for transfer, though the point estimates are smaller in magnitude and only 
moderately significant.   
18 We do not present these results here, but they are available upon request from the authors.   14 
 
schools with higher concentrations of Hispanic students.  Given that these findings indicate that 
similarity between teachers and student demographics may drive teacher preferences, one might 
expect that teachers with higher LAST scores to be more likely to leave schools with higher 
concentrations of lowest-achieving students.  However, Appendix Table 4 shows that, while 
teachers with higher LAST scores are more likely to apply for transfer in general, this effect is not 
higher in schools with higher proportions of lowest-achieving students.  Similarity appears to affect 
preferences in regards to race, but not with regard to academic achievement.   
A major obstacle to identifying the preferences among certain kinds of teachers to apply for 
transfer is disentangling these teacher preferences from school preferences to push out certain kinds 
of teachers. Are white or less experienced teachers, for example, more likely to enter the applications 
pool because these types of teachers prefer to do so? Or, alternatively, are these teachers more likely 
to enter the applications pool because schools are more likely to push them out of their current 
placements, thus leading teachers to seek new jobs?  We make some headway in disentangling these 
explanations by identifying, and removing, teachers who were excessed - displaced from their jobs 
because of a number of factors such as falling enrollment and school closures. We began by 
identifying schools in our work history file that existed in either 2006-2007 or 2007-2008 but were 
absent the subsequent year.  By identifying teachers who were in these schools during their final year 
of operation, we were able to remove all teachers who were excessed as a result of school closure. In 
total, we identified 75 schools that closed over two years, and dropped 992 teachers associated with 
these schools.  We then used human resources data from the NYC Department of Education to 
identify an additional 1,464 teachers who had transferred as a result of being excessed for other 
factors beyond school closure. After omitting a total of 2,456 excessed teachers, we replicated our 
models and obtained similar results.
19  
Dropping excessed teachers in these ways gave us more confidence that our models had 
estimated the preferences of certain kinds of teachers. However, there are likely other ways that 
schools push out teachers that may be difficult to observe and that our data cannot capture. One can 
imagine, for example, that school administrators could  make life difficult for some teachers (e.g. 
assigning too many preps or preps outside of one’s specialty; assigning teachers to the most difficult 
classrooms
20, etc.) as a way to encourage these teachers to apply for transfer. Moreover, it is quite 
possible that schools might systematically push out certain kinds of teachers, e.g.  those of lower 
                                                            
19 See Appendix Table 2 for results after excessed teachers and closing schools were removed.  
20 Feng (2009), for example, finds evidence that classroom characteristics, like disciplinary incidents, indeed may 
influence teacher mobility.  15 
 
quality.
21 Thus, some of the associations we observe may result from this more subtle counseling out 
of certain kinds of teachers by schools, as opposed to preferences among certain kinds of teachers. 
Even so, we suspect that that the number of remaining teachers effected in these ways would be 
relatively small and unlikely to alter our results significantly. 
In summary, we find evidence that teachers with stronger pre-service qualifications are more 
likely to seek transfer. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that such teachers likely have 
better alternative options and are therefore less likely to stay at a job that is not satisfying. We also 
find that teachers who are higher quality according to practice-based measures are less likely to seek 
transfer. One can imagine, for example, that having success with improving student achievement 
may be associated with job and placement satisfaction. That more experienced teachers are less likely 
to request transfers also makes intuitive sense. Those who have been teaching longer are more likely 
to have already found a better workplace match. Finally, Teaching Fellows are more likely to request 
transfer, while Teach for America, black, and Hispanic teachers are less likely.   
 
Question 2: What kinds of teachers do schools want?  
To model the likelihood of being hired as a function of teacher characteristics, we structure 
our data at the application-level.  By using a conditional logit model we are able to estimate 
likelihood of being hired conditional on the set of applicants who had applied to a given school. 
Table 6 presents the results.
22 As mentioned before, it would be more desirable to know which 
teachers received offers than merely who was hired. Though imperfect, knowing which kinds of 
teachers schools tend to hire gets us closer to understanding school demand for certain kinds of 
teachers than most prior research which used transfer data as a way to estimate school preferences 
for teachers.  
  Across our four main teacher quality measures, schools are more likely to hire “higher 
quality” teachers. Schools are significantly more likely to hire teachers with better pre-service 
                                                            
21 We did look at descriptive statistics on those teachers we had identified and removed as excessed for reasons other 
than school closure. Compared to all active teachers in NYC, there were higher proportions of male, older, and black 
teachers. A higher proportion of excessed teachers were also from temporary license and “other” paths. They had lower 
LAST scores and were less likely to come from competitive undergraduate colleges. However, their average experience 
and value-added scores were almost identical.  
22 As discussed previously, we have value-added data only on teachers in grades 4-8. We also have data on college 
competitiveness for a subset of our full sample.  Because we want to estimate the effects of our other predictors on our 
full sample, Model 1 does not include value-added or college competitiveness. Model 2 includes college competitiveness 
and Model 3 includes value-added. We re-ran all three models on our constrained sample of teachers for whom we have 
both value-added and college competitiveness data and got similar results. These models are available upon request from 
the authors.   16 
 
qualifications – LAST score and being from a most competitive college. Schools are also 
significantly more likely to hire more experienced and more effective teachers.
23  The effect of one 
year of experience is comparable in size to being from a competitive undergraduate college, 
increasing the likelihood of being hired by 10 percent. Being an effective teacher also increases the 
likelihood of successfully transferring. An improvement in a teacher’s value-added score of one 
standard deviation increases the likelihood of being hired by 20 percent.
24  This result is somewhat 
surprising given that school hiring authorities do not have access to teachers’ value-added measures 
of effectiveness. 
Controlling for other teacher attributes, black and Hispanic teachers are less likely than white 
teachers to enter the applications pool; however, those who do so have a much higher likelihood of 
getting hired. Hispanic teachers appear to be in particularly high demand.  Schools are about 1.5 
times more likely to hire a Hispanic teacher as compared to a white one, other things equal. Black 
teachers are about 1.3 times more likely than white teachers to be hired.  Appendix Table 3 
demonstrates that high schools, in particular, prefer to hire Hispanic teachers, where the odds of 
being hired if Hispanic are over 1.7 times the odds of being hired if white.  The hiring advantage 
that black teachers have over white teachers mostly occurs in middle and high schools, whereas 
there is no statistically significant difference at the elementary level.   
Table 6 also indicates that the likelihood of being hired varies by preparation pathway, even 
when controlling for other teacher characteristics that may vary by pathway.  As compared to 
college-recommending teachers, schools are significantly more likely to hire Teaching Fellows (an 
increase in the odds ratio by about 30 percent) and Teach for America (an increase in the odds ratio 
by a factor of 1.7 to 2.0) teachers.  As shown in Appendix Table 3, Teaching Fellows have the 
strongest advantage of being hired at high schools while TFA teachers are more likely to be hired at 
middle schools.  In fact, the odds of being hired by a middle school are over three times greater for 
TFA teachers than for college-recommending teachers, even in the most conservative estimates.  
                                                            
23 Here we report teacher effectiveness using teachers’ value-added to student achievement in math.  However, we find 
that the results are similar when using teachers’ value-added to student achievement in ELA.  The point estimate on 
teacher effectiveness in ELA is still positive and statistically significant, though smaller in magnitude – an increase of one 
standard deviation increases the likelihood of being hired by about 10 percent (in ELA) instead of 20 percent (in math). 
24 We re-ran these estimates using two other approaches. In one case, we added school fixed effects on the schools from 
which teachers applied for transfer in addition to school fixed-effects on the schools to which they applied.  In another 
case, we controlled for various school features of teachers’ current placements while still including fixed-effects on the 
schools to which they applied. The size and significance levels of estimates in both cases were consistent with models 
presented here in Table 10. We do not present these models but they are available upon request from the authors.   17 
 
Though TFA teachers are the only early-route teachers less likely than college-
recommending teachers to enter the applications pool in the first place, they are the teachers with 
the highest probability of getting hired. Given that we control for LAST scores and competitiveness 
of college, schools preference for TFA teachers may reflect other academic qualifications or 
characteristics on which TFA selects its members, such as leadership skills and responsibility. What 
does account for this apparent school preference for hiring TFA teachers is a compelling question 
for further study. While teachers from “other” pathways are significantly more likely to enter the 
applications pool than college-recommending teachers, they are significantly less likely to get hired.  
As described last section, we found evidence that similarity between teacher and student 
characteristics affect the decision to apply for transfer.  Here we assess whether teacher-student 
similarity also influences hiring decisions. Appendix Table 4 presents estimates for the likelihood of 
being hired as a function of interactions between teacher and student characteristics. Across 
characteristics, we find that schools are more likely to hire teachers who share the characteristics of 
the student body. Schools with more black students are more likely to hire black teachers; schools 
with more Hispanic students are more likely to hire Hispanic teachers; and schools with more low-
achieving students are more likely to hire teachers with lower LAST scores.  These results, while 
potentially resulting from differential school preferences, might also be driven by differences across 
schools in their ability to hire their applicants.  We do not observe job offers, only the final match.  
Some schools are likely to have more difficulty securing their first choice applicant, as that applicant 
may have other preferable job offers. 
 
Question 3: What do we learn from applications data that we would not have from work 
history files alone? 
 To unpack the methodological advantages of having access to applications data, let us first 
consider what we would have known without it. Table 7 presents results using work-history files 
only – examining who moves and stays among all active NYC teachers over the same two academic 
years.
25  We see that teachers with higher pre-service qualifications – better LAST scores and degrees 
from competitive colleges – are more likely to transfer.  On the other hand, more experienced and 
                                                            
25 Because we do not have college competitiveness data on our full sample, we run Model 1 without college 
competitiveness as an indicator. As discussed previously, we have value-added data only on teachers in grades 3-8. Since 
we wanted to show results for our full sample in our other models, we include value-added as a quality indicator only in 
Model 6.  We re-ran all models on teachers for whom we have both value-added and college competitiveness data and 
got similar results. These models are available upon request from the authors.   18 
 
more effective teachers are less likely to transfer, though the effect of teacher effectiveness is non-
significant.
26 
 We also find that the likelihood of transfer is not significantly different for black and 
Hispanic teachers than it is for white ones. However, the direction of our coefficients are in keeping 
with prior research that has found significant differences between these groups – namely, white 
teachers are more likely to transfer than black or Hispanic teachers from the same school. Finally, 
consistent with our review of the literature, our results indicate that teachers from early-entry 
pathways into teaching are significantly more likely to transfer than are college-recommending 
teachers. This is true for all but TFA teachers who are significantly less likely to transfer, again 
probably reflecting TFA’s policy of placing teachers in difficult-to-staff schools and requiring two 
years of service. The likelihood of transferring is particularly high for Teaching Fellows. Being from 
this preparation pathway increases the odds of transferring by almost as much as being a first year 
teacher. 
These results provide information about which teachers are more likely to transfer. What we 
don’t know from the work-history files is the extent to which teacher or school preferences drive 
these results.  We might inappropriately speculate from the results in Table 7that schools prefer 
hiring ineffective or inexperienced teachers. Our analyses of applications data reveal, however, that 
schools are much more likely to hire teachers who demonstrate higher quality on these practice-
based measures.  In fact, by differentiating school and teacher preferences using applications data, 
we find a demand among schools for teachers exhibiting quality on both practice-based measures 
and pre-service qualifications.  The fact that pre-service qualifications predict transferring while 
practice-based quality predict staying is explained by teacher preferences (supply) to enter the jobs 
market rather than school preferences (demand) for certain teachers. Regardless of how quality is 
signaled, higher quality teachers are more likely to get hired than lower quality ones; teachers who 
appear higher on pre-service qualifications and lower on practice-based quality are more likely to 
transfer because these groups are significantly more likely to request transfers in the first place.  
Looking beyond these two sets of teacher quality measures, our analyses of applications data 
shed light on the relationships between other teacher characteristics that could proxy for quality and 
                                                            
26 These results are consistent with prior work in the direction of the effect, though other studies have found the effect 
on teacher effectiveness to be statistically significant. One possible explanation is that here we are considering only two 
years of data. By contrast, Boyd et. al. (2007) looked across a six year period and focused on new teachers. They found 
that the effect is particularly strong for first year teachers. Because the effect likely diminishes with experience, the non-
significant estimate in this current study may also reflect that we include teachers across the experience spectrum.   19 
 
likelihood of transfer. In particular, our analysis of work-history files reveals no significant 
differences in likelihood of transfer across teacher race. One might falsely conclude from our work 
history data that there are no differences in hiring by teacher race when, in fact, strong differences 
on both the supply and demand sides become evident when analyzing applications data. We find 
that black and Hispanic teachers are significantly less likely than white teachers to request transfer. 
At the same time, among teachers who enter the applications pool, black and Hispanic teachers are 
significantly more likely than white teachers to get hired.  Because the weak supply of black and 
Hispanic teachers is cancelled out by the greater demand for them, work history files do not reveal 
significant differences in transferring by race. These differences were evident only upon inspecting 
applications data. 
Finally, our analysis of work-history files indicates that teachers from Teaching Fellows are 
more likely to transfer than teachers from college-recommending programs, while TFA teachers are 
actually less likely to transfer. Without the applications data, however, we cannot be sure whether 
early-entry teachers are more likely to transfer because they are more likely to choose to enter the 
applications pool or because schools prefer to hire them. We find that a combination of supply and 
demand side explanations account for this variation by preparation route. Given that there is 
significantly higher supply and demand for Teaching Fellows, it is no surprise that Teaching Fellows 
have the highest likelihood of transferring (the odds are 1.3 to 1.4 times greater than college-
recommending teachers). Demand-side explanations seem to account for the relatively higher 
likelihood of transfer among TFA teachers. Our analysis of applications-for-transfer data reveal that, 
among all preparation routes, TFA teachers are in highest demand (according to our estimates of 
who gets hired) – a finding that was hidden when examining work history files alone.  Despite being 
in high demand, TFA teachers are the least likely to transfer because they are the least likely to enter 




This study contributes to a recent and growing body of research examining the relationship 
between teacher quality and career pathways. Consistent with prior work, we find that this 
relationship depends upon the dimension of quality under study.  In particular, pre-service 
qualifications (LAST teacher certification exam scores and being from a competitive college) predict 
greater teacher migration while practice-based quality measures (teaching experience and value-20 
 
added to student achievement) predict lower teacher migration. Our research adds to prior work in 
pulling apart the role of teacher preferences from the role of school preferences in explaining the 
driving mechanisms behind this observed difference in transfer patterns by type of quality.  We find 
that schools are significantly more likely to hire teachers across all four dimensions of teacher 
quality.  Thus, differences in transfer patterns exist not because of school preferences but because 
teachers with external qualifications are more likely to enter the jobs market, while more experienced 
and more effective teachers are less likely to do so.   
In addition to examining quality as defined above, this study addresses two additional 
measures that may proxy for quality, teachers’ race or ethnicity and their preparation pathway into 
the profession. While these two characteristics are not direct measures of quality they may represent 
qualities that schools look for in hiring decisions. The over-representation of white teachers relative 
to student demographics suggests that non-white teachers may be in demand. Similarly, the 
differences in preparation or recruitment and selection methods across pathways suggest that 
schools may seek out teachers from particular pathways. Prior studies that control for school, 
district, and other teacher characteristics find that black and Hispanic teachers are more likely to stay 
in schools from year-to-year than are white teachers.
27 Among transferring teachers, one possible 
explanation is that black and Hispanic teachers are less likely to apply for transfer; another 
explanation might be that they are requesting transfers at similar rates, but school hiring practices 
give white teachers preference. Our analysis of applications data provides support for the former, 
supply-side explanation and evidence against the latter, demand-side explanation. Black and 
Hispanic teachers are significantly less likely than white teachers to enter the applications pool to 
begin with; however, when black and Hispanic teachers enter the applications pool they are far more 
likely to get hired.  
  While prior work typically finds that teachers from early-entry pathways leave teaching at 
higher rates than do teachers from college-recommending programs, we know less about whether 
teachers from early-entry pathways are more likely to apply for transfer or, when they do apply, 
whether they are more likely to get hired.  Applications data reveal that Teaching Fellows are more 
likely to apply for transfer than are college-recommending teachers, while TFA teachers - who have 
committed to stay in schools for two years - are not. On the other hand, schools are more likely to 
                                                            
27 The coefficients of our estimates of the effect of race in our work history files reveal are in the same direction as prior 
work, i.e. black and Hispanic teachers are less likely to transfer, but the estimates are non-significant. One possible 
reason for why our estimates are non-significant may be that we have limited our focus to teacher transfer, while much 
of the prior work looks at turnover more generally (including both transfer and attrition).   21 
 
hire early-entry teachers than those from a college-recommending pathway, especially TFA corps 
members. Given that our models include school fixed-effects, differential applying by preparation 
pathway away from and to different kinds of schools cannot explain observed pathway effects.  
Since these models also control for other teacher characteristics - including various measures of 
teacher quality, race, age, gender - differential sorting of different kinds of teachers into various 
pathways based on these measured characteristics cannot account for these pathway effects either.  
Our study also makes methodological contributions. Most notably, we are aware of no other 
study that has used applications data to examine the relationship between teacher characteristics and 
transfer. We have made the case that using applications data has many advantages over using work 
history files alone. Perhaps most significant, applications data allows us to get closer to estimating 
both teacher and school preferences, and thus move away from speculation on what is driving 
patterns in teacher migration.  
Our analyses of applications data also has implications for how to improve on this work. In 
particular, gaining access to information on which teachers received job offers, in addition to hiring 
information, would improve future efforts to model school preferences for teachers. Moreover, 
knowing which schools teachers chose out of those that made job offers to them would help our 
estimates of teacher preferences for certain kinds of schools. In trying to model the preferences of 
certain kinds of teachers to apply for transfer, one of our biggest obstacles has been separating out 
teachers’ preferences to leave from schools’ tendencies to push out certain kinds of teachers. We 
have made significant headway by identifying and dropping teachers that have been excessed.  
However, there are certainly other, more subtle and difficult-to-observe, ways that schools may push 
out teachers. Identifying these, collecting data on them, and controlling for them would make us 
more certain that we are estimating preferences among certain kinds of teachers rather than 
differential pushing out of certain kinds of teachers by schools.  Another way to build on this work 
would be to study other measures of teacher quality beyond those included here. For example, 
researchers are currently developing standards-based instruments of teacher practice that may better 
measure teacher quality or, at least, may provide measures of aspects of teacher quality not captured 
by the variables included in this study (Grossman et. al., 2010). Future studies might examine 
whether scores on these instruments are similarly associated with transferring and hiring behaviors. 
Finally, our preliminary analyses suggest that similarity between teacher and student body may help 
to explain applications and hiring processes. We intend to examine this process in greater detail in a 
separate study.   22 
 
Disentangling supply from demand in teacher transfers has the potential to inform policy. 
Knowing what kinds of teachers try to leave schools and what kinds of teachers schools want to hire 
can help target policy to attract and retain better quality teachers. As described above, our access to 
applications data accompanied a substantial change in transfer policy in New York from seniority-
based transfers to an open-market process. Our results demonstrate that, under this new system, 
schools are selecting higher quality teachers – imperfectly measured, but measured on multiple 
dimensions  – from the pool of teachers available to them.  The results also show that teachers who 
are more effective, holding all else equal, are less likely to seek transfer.  These results suggests some 
positive dynamics in an open-market system.  For example, schools appear to be choosing, on 
average, in the best interest of their students instead of for some alternative goal that would lead 
them to choose less-effective teachers.  However, this study is not an evaluation of seniority-based 
or market-based transfer policies.  While hiring on quality under a market-based system may benefit 
the individual school, it may well have unintended negative consequences for the system as a whole.  
In particular, low-performing or otherwise difficult-to-staff schools may lose effective teachers who 
find it easier to transfer to more appealing schools in a market-based system.  In other work, we are 
examining whether the policy changes have resulted in differential sorting of high quality teachers 
away from lower-performing schools, as well as assessing the effects that the migration patterns on 
student achievement at different schools.  The current paper is not a direct evaluation, but instead it 
is a source of information on the factors driving teachers' and schools' decisions.  Understanding 
these preferences can aid in the design of policies aimed to retain the best teachers in schools they 






TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics on active teachers in NYC 
  Overall Appliers  Movers 
# of Active Teachers   80,898  11,076  4,693 
Teacher Demographic Information 
Proportion Female   0.75  0.71  0.70 
Proportion White   0.62  0.59  0.56 
Proportion Black   0.19  0.21  0.23 
Proportion Hispanic   0.13  0.12  0.14 
Proportion Other, non-white   0.06  0.08  0.08 
Age (mean)  41.33  38.55  37.45 
Teacher Preparation Route 
Proportion College-Recommending  0.43  0.36  0.32 
Proportion TF   0.12  0.18  0.23 
Proportion TFA   0.02  0.01  0.02 
Proportion Temporary License   0.22  0.22  0.22 
Proportion Other Path   0.21  0.23  0.21 
Teacher Pre-Service and Practice-Based Quality Measures 
Proportion Most Comp College   0.33  0.38  0.41 
LAST (mean)   247.83  249.81  252.84 
Experience (mean)   7.49  5.26  5.08 
Math Value-Added (mean)   -0.35  -0.36  -0.34 
 
 
TABLE 2: School characteristics (School-level averages over 2003-2006)  
Variable Observations  Mean  SD 
Proportion Elementary  1366  0.54  0.50 
Proportion Middle School  1366  0.20  0.39 
Proportion High School  1366  0.26  0.44 
% Female  1360  49.82  7.43 
% Black  1360  36.29  28.77 
% Hispanic  1360  40.15  25.58 
% Asian  1360  10.86  15.57 
% ELL  1297  13.23  13.72 
% Free Lunch  1304  69.68  22.84 
Attendance Rate  1304  90.31  5.81 
Proportion New (1998)  1366  0.34  0.47 
% Faculty 5+ Yrs Exp  1351  47.54  18.73 
Enrollment/100  1360  7.46  6.16 
% Special Ed  1294  4.56  4.30 
Suspensions/Enrollment  1349  0.05  0.09 
Proportion High Crime   1225  0.27  0.44 

















White Teachers  27.48  38.44  63.96  13.31 
Black Teachers  55.81  33.92  75.89  19.49 
Hispanic Teachers  26.94  57.10  77.51  16.86 




College-Rec. 30.41  37.55  66.64  12.73 
Teaching Fellows  37.36  48.34  75.28  19.07 
TFA 37.77  57.06  84.03  23.32 
Temp. License  36.56  42.19  70.60  18.35 
Other 35.09  38.77  67.47  15.63 
Barron's College 
Rating 
Least Competitive  34.42  38.58  69.31  15.28 
Less Competitive  34.66  39.48  70.12  14.79 
Competitive  28.77  40.43  65.25  14.21 
Most Competitive  31.62  42.97  66.61  14.86 
LAST Score 
Quartile 1 (Low)  37.89  41.77  74.26  16.62 
Quartile 2  34.79  39.83  70.46  15.09 
Quartile 3  32.64  40.78  68.06  15.18 
Quartile 4 (High)  32.60  43.55  67.53  16.31 
Teaching 
Experience 
Quartile 1 (Low)  34.55  42.86  70.63  16.12 
Quartile 2  33.97  40.19  69.26  15.48 
Quartile 3  32.94  38.89  67.77  14.39 
Quartile 4 (High)  31.57  37.63  65.59  14.40 
Math Value-
Added to Student 
Achievement 
Quartile 1 (Low)  27.93  39.94  71.20  17.21 
Quartile 2  32.14  39.67  71.57  16.34 
Quartile 3  35.75  39.46  73.33  15.22 





















TABLE 4: Modeling requests for transfer to and away from schools as a function of school 
characteristics (School-level) 
 
VARIABLES Log(applicants  away/enrollment) Log(applicants to/vacancies)
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Middle School  0.3847***  0.5398~  -0.4258***  0.4183 
  (0.0668)  (0.3072)  (0.0777)  (0.3899) 
High  School  0.0303 0.3029 0.0254  0.6662 
  (0.0898) (0.3452) (0.0997)  (0.4230) 
Other Non-Elementary  0.5491  0.7780*  -0.8834*  -0.5647 
  (0.3605)  (0.3886)  (0.3885)  (0.4364) 
% Black Students  0.0072***  0.0020  -0.0059**  -0.0047* 
  (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0019)  (0.0022) 
% Hispanic Students  0.0059**  0.0008  -0.0039~  -0.0039 
  (0.0020)  (0.0023)  (0.0022)  (0.0025) 
% Asian Students  0.0027  0.0018  0.0041  0.0044 
  (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0025)  (0.0029) 
% ELL Students  -0.0040~  -0.0010  -0.0008  0.0028 
  (0.0021)  (0.0041)  (0.0026)  (0.0047) 
% Free Lunch  0.0082***  0.0100***  -0.0041*  -0.0062* 
  (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0019)  (0.0025) 
Attendance Rate  -0.0193**  -0.0682***  0.0042  -0.0369 
  (0.0063)  (0.0189)  (0.0075)  (0.0227) 
New School (1998)  0.1289  0.1232  0.0021  -0.0399 
  (0.1144) (0.1711) (0.1306)  (0.2034) 
% Teachers 5+ Experience  -0.0132***  -0.0164***  0.0002  0.0057* 
  (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0019)  (0.0028) 
Enrollment/100  -0.0271*** -0.0492*** -0.0161**  -0.0079 
  (0.0044) (0.0093) (0.0049)  (0.0110) 
New School * Enrollment  -0.0081  -0.0161  0.0092  0.0256 
  (0.0178)  (0.0239)  (0.0201)  (0.0279) 
% Special Ed Students  0.0105~  0.0048  -0.0054  -0.0074 
  (0.0056) (0.0080) (0.0072)  (0.0096) 
Suspensions/enrollment  0.9158***  1.3717**  0.3633  0.1143 
  (0.2590)  (0.5258)  (0.3102)  (0.8852) 
School Crime (Highest 25%)  0.0896  -0.0526  -0.2500**  -0.3181** 
  (0.0691) (0.0855) (0.0780)  (0.1007) 
% Level 1 in Math     0.0090*    -0.0063 
    (0.0037)    (0.0044) 
8th grade exam dummy    -0.2999    -0.7166~ 
   (0.3065)    (0.3885) 
Constant  -3.5646***  1.4412  3.9871***  7.5599*** 
  (0.6490)  (1.8123)  (0.7553)  (2.1658) 
Observations 1108  802  1012  731 
Adj.  R-squared  0.4381 0.4207 0.1971  0.2466 




TABLE 5: Modeling who applies for transfer as a function of teacher characteristics (Fixed 
effects on current school; estimates as odds ratios) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Female  0.9714  0.9844  0.9815  0.9822  0.9643 
  (0.0261)  (0.0307)  (0.0306)  (0.0306)  (0.0755) 
Black Teacher  0.7201***  0.7525*** 0.7270*** 0.7277*** 0.7107*** 
  (0.0246) (0.0297) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0648) 
Hispanic Teacher  0.8149***  0.8401***  0.8032***  0.8034***  0.6516*** 
  (0.0309)  (0.0355)  (0.0339)  (0.0339)  (0.0683) 
Other, Non-White Teacher  1.2024***  1.0838 1.0753 1.0765 0.8163 
  (0.0512) (0.0624) (0.0619) (0.0619) (0.1201) 
Indicator Year 2  0.8323***  0.8563***  0.8505***  0.8499***  0.8418** 
  (0.0189)  (0.0223)  (0.0222)  (0.0222)  (0.0502) 
Years Experience  0.9314*** 0.9338***     0.9221*** 
 (0.0042)  (0.0047)      (0.0123) 
Teaching Fellow  1.2018***  1.2409***  1.3646***  1.3602***  1.4626*** 
  (0.0422)  (0.0505)  (0.0551)  (0.0549)  (0.1480) 
TFA  0.2722*** 0.4396*** 0.4672*** 0.4680*** 0.5213* 
  (0.0276) (0.0575) (0.0612) (0.0613) (0.1516) 
Temporary License  1.0838*  1.0909*  0.9951  1.0005  1.1801~ 
  (0.0380)  (0.0415)  (0.0366)  (0.0369)  (0.1051) 
Other  Path  1.1287***  1.1107** 1.1356** 1.1340** 1.1438 
  (0.0375) (0.0435) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.1158) 
LAST  1.0020***  1.0025***  1.0026***  1.0026***  1.0012 
  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0012) 
Age  0.9979  0.9946*** 0.9883*** 0.9869*** 0.9922* 
  (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0038) 
Most Comp College    1.1027**  1.1038**  1.1046***  1.2067* 
    (0.0331)  (0.0332)  (0.0332)  (0.0897) 
First Year Dummy      1.4551***  0.9938   
     (0.0574)  (0.1360)   
First Year * Age        1.0124**   
        (0.0043)   
Teacher Value Added (standardized)          0.9044** 
      (0.0343) 
Observations  88917 70440 70440 70440 10660 
chi^2  1174.8908  883.9484 776.4900 784.8708 212.0278 
Number of schools  1399  1352  1352  1352  618 
Pvalue  0 0 0 0 0 










TABLE 6: Modeling the likelihood of being hired as a function of teacher characteristics  
 (Application-level; fixed effects on schools to which teachers apply; estimates as odds 
ratios) 
 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Female  1.0596  1.0797  0.9722 
  (0.0458)  (0.0543)  (0.1078) 
Black Teacher  1.3415***  1.3315***  1.2319~ 
 (0.0707)  (0.0811)  (0.1482) 
Hispanic Teacher  1.5125***  1.5253***  1.6136** 
  (0.0890)  (0.1006)  (0.2423) 
Other, Non-White Teacher 0.7889***  0.9563  0.7836 
 (0.0565)  (0.0863)  (0.1403) 
Year 2007 indicator  1.4633***  1.4406***  1.3023** 
  (0.0607)  (0.0686)  (0.1283) 
Experience 1.0850*** 1.0792*** 1.1155*** 
 (0.0074)  (0.0082)  (0.0211) 
Teaching Fellow  1.2713***  1.2798***  1.1240 
  (0.0671)  (0.0775)  (0.1484) 
TFA 2.0387***  1.6650**  2.6506** 
 (0.2807)  (0.2852)  (0.9744) 
Temporary License  1.1080~  1.1307~  0.9211 
  (0.0674)  (0.0737)  (0.1305) 
Other Pathway  0.8658*  0.8201**  0.9463 
 (0.0498)  (0.0560)  (0.1368) 
LAST  1.0064***  1.0051***  1.0069*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0018) 
Age 0.9646***  0.9667***  0.9677*** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0028)  (0.0056) 
Most Competitive College    1.1060*   
    (0.0529)   
Teacher Value-Added (standardized)      1.2045*** 
     (0.0567) 
Observations 103442  72341  9310 
Pvalue 0  0  0 
Number of schools  1024  946  410 
chi^2 779.7193  463.1385  143.6215 













TABLE 7: Modeling the likelihood of transfer as a function of teacher characteristics  
(Fixed effects on current school; estimates as odds ratios)   
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Female  0.9874  1.0235  1.0210  1.0220  0.8415* 
  (0.0327)  (0.0397)  (0.0396)  (0.0396)  (0.0721) 
Black  Teacher  1.0444 1.0491 1.0300 1.0319 1.1076 
  (0.0427) (0.0501) (0.0491) (0.0492) (0.1118) 
Hispanic Teacher  1.0056  1.0055  0.9785  0.9780  0.9248 
  (0.0469)  (0.0531)  (0.0516)  (0.0515)  (0.1096) 
Other, Non-White Teacher  1.2123***  1.2454** 1.2348** 1.2376** 1.2920~ 
  (0.0655) (0.0889) (0.0882) (0.0883) (0.1822) 
Year 2007 Indicator  1.1107***  1.1023**  1.1130**  1.1116**  1.1112 
  (0.0314)  (0.0358)  (0.0364)  (0.0363)  (0.0751) 
Experience 0.9534***  0.9589***    0.9469*** 
  (0.0052)  (0.0059)    (0.0141) 
Teaching Fellow  1.3209***  1.3068***  1.3893***  1.3837***  1.3462** 
  (0.0578)  (0.0672)  (0.0709)  (0.0706)  (0.1548) 
Teach for America  0.4745***  0.6289**  0.6597**  0.6608**  0.5769* 
  (0.0517) (0.0948) (0.0994) (0.0997) (0.1480) 
Temporary License  1.1667***  1.1730***  1.1277**  1.1379**  1.2745* 
  (0.0508)  (0.0553)  (0.0518)  (0.0524)  (0.1348) 
Other Preparation Route  1.1373**  1.1119* 1.1198* 1.1163* 1.1644 
  (0.0481) (0.0560) (0.0563) (0.0562) (0.1303) 
LAST  1.0028***  1.0022**  1.0022**  1.0022**  1.0018 
  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0014) 
Age 0.9903***  0.9882***  0.9847*** 0.9825*** 0.9839*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0044) 
Most Competitive College    1.1293**  1.1304**  1.1310**   
    (0.0426)  (0.0426)  (0.0427)   
First Year Teacher      1.4498***  0.7881   
      (0.0730) (0.1349)  
First Year * Age        1.0199***   
        (0.0053)   
Teacher Value-Added (standardized)          0.9472 
      (0.0395) 
Observations  83265 64078 64078 64078 10676 
chi^2  443.4306 315.6424 320.0849 333.7515 82.6130 
Number of schools  1309  1231  1231  1231  538 
Pvalue  0 0 0 0 0 










TABLE 1: Modeling who applies for transfer as a function of teacher characteristics (Fixed 
effects on current school; estimates as odds ratios) – By School Level 
 
 Elementary  Middle High 
Teacher Characteristics  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Female 0.9193  0.9057  1.0666  1.0615 0.9826 
 (0.0526)  (0.0977)  (0.0620)  (0.1273) (0.0531) 
Black Teacher  0.6917***  0.7135**  0.7377***  0.6817* 0.8393* 
 (0.0428)  (0.0832)  (0.0581)  (0.1070) (0.0678) 
Hispanic Teacher  0.8318**  0.7107**  0.7755**  0.5329** 0.9825 
 (0.0510)  (0.0899)  (0.0691)  (0.1058) (0.0870) 
Other, Non-White Teacher 1.1856~  0.9470  0.9371  0.6062* 1.1186 
 (0.1031)  (0.1809)  (0.1159)  (0.1484) (0.1220) 
Indicator Year 2  0.7813***  0.7895**  0.8431**  0.8871 0.9205 
 (0.0304)  (0.0586)  (0.0452)  (0.0950) (0.0487) 
Years Experience  0.9328*** 0.9295*** 0.9348***  0.9177*** 0.9391*** 
 (0.0071)  (0.0153)  (0.0100)  (0.0223) (0.0097) 
Teaching Fellow  1.3939*** 1.5511*** 1.2032*  1.3793~ 1.1614~ 
 (0.0871)  (0.1985)  (0.0994)  (0.2393) (0.0946) 
TFA 0.3628***  0.4829~  0.4698***  0.4931~ 0.6003 
 (0.0743)  (0.2071)  (0.0928)  (0.2085) (0.2354) 
Temporary License  1.1017  1.2625*  0.9791  0.9272 1.1730* 
 (0.0651)  (0.1391)  (0.0754)  (0.1523) (0.0912) 
Other Path  1.1303*  1.1125  1.0902  1.1219 1.0536 
 (0.0652)  (0.1396)  (0.0905)  (0.2067) (0.0870) 
LAST 1.1046***  1.0468  1.0574~  1.0019 1.0643~ 
 (0.0269)  (0.0493)  (0.0350)  (0.0649) (0.0366) 
Age 0.9838***  0.9846**  1.0004  1.0015 1.0060* 
 (0.0025)  (0.0050)  (0.0031)  (0.0063) (0.0029) 
Most Comp College  1.0872~  1.1946~  1.1428*  1.2382~ 1.0444 
 (0.0509)  (0.1118)  (0.0689)  (0.1605) (0.0611) 
Teacher Value Added (standardized)    0.9412    0.8070**  
   (0.0422)    (0.0622)  
Observations 35135  7330  13179  3061 16427 










APPENDIX TABLE 2: Modeling who applies for transfer as a function of teacher 
characteristics (Fixed effects on current school; excessed teachers & closing schools 
dropped; estimates as odds ratios) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Female  0.9632  0.9804  0.9790  0.9798  0.9545 
  (0.0265)  (0.0312)  (0.0312)  (0.0312)  (0.0763) 
Black Teacher  0.7253***  0.7566*** 0.7323*** 0.7332*** 0.7243*** 
  (0.0254) (0.0305) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0672) 
Hispanic Teacher  0.8146***  0.8338***  0.7958***  0.7961***  0.6501*** 
  (0.0315)  (0.0359)  (0.0343)  (0.0343)  (0.0697) 
Other, Non-White Teacher  1.1847***  1.0682 1.0606 1.0615 0.7978 
  (0.0515) (0.0627) (0.0622) (0.0623) (0.1197) 
Indicator Year 2  0.8145***  0.8391***  0.8331***  0.8324***  0.8399** 
  (0.0189)  (0.0222)  (0.0222)  (0.0222)  (0.0509) 
Years Experience  0.9300*** 0.9324***     0.9183*** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0048)      (0.0125) 
Teaching Fellow  1.1901***  1.2292***  1.3543***  1.3492***  1.3905** 
  (0.0423)  (0.0507)  (0.0554)  (0.0552)  (0.1429) 
TFA  0.2799*** 0.4654*** 0.4962*** 0.4972*** 0.5073* 
  (0.0283) (0.0608) (0.0648) (0.0649) (0.1486) 
Temporary License  1.0841*  1.0863*  0.9876  0.9938  1.1779~ 
  (0.0390)  (0.0423)  (0.0373)  (0.0376)  (0.1066) 
Other Path  1.1079**  1.0928*  1.1205**  1.1187**  1.0973 
  (0.0377) (0.0437) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.1134) 
LAST  1.0023***  1.0026***  1.0027***  1.0027***  1.0017 
  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0013) 
Age  0.9977~  0.9945*** 0.9880*** 0.9864*** 0.9918* 
  (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0039) 
Most Comp College    1.0981**  1.0985**  1.0994**  1.1985* 
    (0.0335)  (0.0335)  (0.0336)  (0.0904) 
First Year Dummy      1.4461***  0.9553   
     (0.0575)  (0.1318)   
First Year * Age        1.0135**   
        (0.0043)   
Teacher Value Added (VA)          0.6232** 
      (0.1014) 
Observations  86551 68711 68711 68711 10361 
chi^2  1153.6519  876.5948 767.3573 777.1013 209.4378 
Pvalue  0 0 0 0 0 
Number of schools  1371  1328  1328  1328  599 





APPENDIX TABLE 3: Modeling the likelihood of being hired as a function of teacher 
characteristics (application-level; school fixed-effects; estimates as odds ratios) – By School 
Level 
 
 Elementary  Middle High 
Teacher Characteristics  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Female 1.0427  0.8314  1.2644~  1.0030 0.9506 
 (0.1021)  (0.1324)  (0.1560)  (0.2388) (0.0774) 
Black Teacher  1.0570  0.9313  1.6905***  2.2144** 1.3407* 
 (0.1126)  (0.1617)  (0.2348)  (0.5626) (0.1552) 
Hispanic Teacher  1.3178**  1.3511  1.3358~  2.4931** 1.8870*** 
 (0.1410)  (0.2776)  (0.2313)  (0.8770) (0.2280) 
Other, Non-White Teacher 0.9004  0.8351  0.7810  0.9595 1.2793 
 (0.1320)  (0.2332)  (0.1874)  (0.3702) (0.1949) 
Indicator Year 2  1.5357***  1.6928***  1.5459***  0.8882 1.3651*** 
 (0.1190)  (0.2295)  (0.1836)  (0.1977) (0.1151) 
Years Experience  1.0680*** 1.1281*** 1.0564**  1.1596*** 1.1151*** 
 (0.0130)  (0.0276)  (0.0219)  (0.0503) (0.0156) 
Teaching Fellow  1.0895  0.9091  1.1103  1.7615~ 1.5551*** 
 (0.1105)  (0.1646)  (0.1759)  (0.5715) (0.1716) 
TFA 1.6543  1.3979  3.1028***  9.9770** 0.8647 
 (0.5198)  (0.8212)  (0.9383)  (7.1732) (0.3474) 
Temporary License  1.0696  0.7711  1.6732**  1.4108 0.9821 
 (0.1170)  (0.1478)  (0.2662)  (0.4496) (0.1210) 
Other Path  0.8015*  0.9932  0.9871  1.5461 0.8183 
 (0.0872)  (0.1862)  (0.1733)  (0.5573) (0.1048) 
LAST 1.0026~  1.0071**  1.0037~  1.0056 1.0094*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0025)  (0.0022)  (0.0038) (0.0018) 
Age 0.9757***  0.9735***  0.9580***  0.9535*** 0.9641*** 
 (0.0048)  (0.0079)  (0.0069)  (0.0129) (0.0048) 
Most Comp College  1.1460~    1.1077   1.0363 
 (0.0938)    (0.1292)   (0.0882) 
Teacher Value Added (standardized)    1.2313***    1.0309  
   (0.0756)    (0.1103)  
Observations 31714  5648  9398  1506 23555 








Appendix Table 4: Likelihood of Applying for Transfer and of Being Hired as a Function of 
Interactions Between Teacher Characteristics and Student Characteristics (School fixed-
effects; estimates as odds ratios) 
 
  Likelihood of Applying Likelihood of Being Hired
Teacher Characteristics:  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3
Female  0.9824 0.9792 0.9608 1.0677 1.0704 1.1788*
  (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0400) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0980)
Black Teacher  1.3401*** 0.7442*** 0.6921*** 0.4936*** 1.3327***  1.1410
  (0.1041) (0.0307) (0.0346) (0.0626) (0.0881) (0.1035)
Hispanic Teacher  0.8544*** 1.2667* 0.8021*** 1.4480*** 0.8257  1.1910~
  (0.0373) (0.1174) (0.0419) (0.1036) (0.1296) (0.1183)
Other, Non-White Teacher  1.0776 1.0927 1.0705 0.9883 0.9849 0.8295
  (0.0641) (0.0648) (0.0790) (0.0943) (0.0940) (0.1106)
Indicator Year 2  0.8202*** 0.8201*** 0.7898*** 1.4859*** 1.4845*** 1.7076***
  (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0256) (0.0749) (0.0748) (0.1183)
Years Experience  0.9328*** 0.9326*** 0.9319*** 1.0835*** 1.0839*** 1.0700***
  (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0120)
Teaching Fellow  1.2303*** 1.2345*** 1.2942*** 1.2514*** 1.2518***  1.2162*
  (0.0518) (0.0519) (0.0666) (0.0822) (0.0820) (0.1095)
TFA  0.4493*** 0.4357*** 0.4558*** 1.7162** 1.7078** 2.1907**
  (0.0589) (0.0572) (0.0682) (0.3102) (0.3088) (0.5349)
Temporary License  1.1002* 1.1016* 1.0678 1.1021 1.1017 1.2253*
  (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0508) (0.0775) (0.0776) (0.1167)
Other Path  1.0990* 1.0994* 1.1443** 0.8458* 0.8464*  0.9243
  (0.0448) (0.0447) (0.0552) (0.0618) (0.0618) (0.0889)
LAST  1.0821*** 1.0800*** 1.1370*** 1.0047*** 1.0048***  1.0064**
  (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0356) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0020)
Age  0.9949** 0.9950** 0.9898*** 0.9664*** 0.9665*** 0.9713***
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0041)
Most Comp College  1.0934** 1.0929** 1.0924* 1.1115* 1.1035~ 1.1991*
  (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0414) (0.0576) (0.0570) (0.0853)
Black Teacher * %  Black Ss  0.9886***   1.0231***   
  (0.0013) (0.0024)  
Hispanic Teacher * %  Hispanic Ss  0.9923***   1.0120***   
  (0.0016) (0.0028) 
LAST * %  Lowest-Achieving Ss  0.9978~  0.9996***
  (0.0012)  (0.0001)
Observations  65464 65464 46490 66510 66510 36999
Chi^2  933 881 786 502 417 208





FIGURE A: Histograms of Teacher Quality Measures 
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Figure B1b: Residuals from multivariate model for Applicants per Vacancy (School-level) 
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